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 
Abstract—A potential threat to embedded systems is the 
execution of unknown or malicious software capable of triggering 
harmful system behaviour, aimed at theft of sensitive data or 
causing damage to the system. Commercial off-the-shelf 
embedded devices, such as embedded medical equipment, are 
more vulnerable as these type of products cannot be amended 
conventionally or have limited resources to implement protection 
mechanisms. In this paper, we present a Self-Organising Map 
based approach to enhance embedded system security by 
detecting abnormal program behaviour. The proposed method 
extracts features derived from processor’s Program Counter and 
Cycles per Instruction, and then utilises the features to identify 
abnormal behaviour using the SOM. Results achieved in our 
experiment show that the proposed method can identify 
unknown program behaviours not included in the training set 
with over 98.4% accuracy. 
 
Index Terms—Embedded system security, abnormal 
behaviour detection, intrusion detection, Self-Organising Map. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
he widespread use of embedded systems today has 
significantly changed the way we create, destroy, share, 
process and manage information. For instance, an embedded 
medical device often processes sensitive information or 
performs critical functions for multiple patients. 
Consequently, security of embedded systems is emerging as 
an important concern in embedded system design [1, 2]. 
Although security has been extensively explored in the context 
of general purpose computing and communications systems, 
for example via cryptographic algorithms and security 
protocols [3], such security solutions usually are often 
incompatible with particular embedded architectures. The 
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reason for this is, that embedded architectures use custom 
firmware or operating systems, and are normally specific to a 
certain function with limited cost and resource, which makes 
e.g. conventional antivirus (AV) programs difficult to 
implement. Generally, the protection of embedded systems 
can be developed either at hardware or/and at software level. 
From hardware perspective, Physical Unclonable Function 
(PUF) [4] or hardware intrinsic security [5], has been 
proposed to secure embedded devices physically. The 
manufacturing process variation is first used to identify the 
integrated circuits, and then the identifications are 
subsequently used for cryptography. There are also works 
focusing on detecting software failure, tampering and 
malicious codes in embedded architectures [1, 6]. The main 
disadvantage of these approaches is that they require storing 
sensitive data in the system as “valid” samples or templates. 
For example, a basic-block control-flow graph (CFG) is 
usually stored and used to exam the running program. 
Embedded devices that are used in the medical and 
industrial domains usually perform a small number of 
repetitive functions or operate in a simplified state space. The 
execution space may include activities such as actuating an 
electrical relay, controlling a pump, or collecting sensor 
readings [7]. This intrinsic behaviour makes them unsuitable 
for conventional AV and exposes deviation in normal program 
execution as a means of detecting compromised activities. 
There are currently alternative solutions that may secure 
vulnerable embedded architectures [8], [9], where machine 
learning and pattern recognition algorithms are employed on 
human-machine interaction. ICMetrics (Integrated Circuit 
metrics) [10], is one of the on-going research areas  into  
embedded    security,   which    relies    on   the   unique   trace 
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Fig. 1. A typical embedded system and ICMetrics system.  
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generated on the embedded architecture by its regular user or 
environment. The concept of ICMetrics is akin to biometrics 
in humans.  Fig. 1 exhibits a typical embedded system and 
ICMetrics system. 
The ICMetrics based system can offer multiple advantages 
over traditional static AV approach like scanning executable, 
instruction sequences and CFG of an application, which does 
not need to store user data or template and supports from 
operating systems. Our approach is suitable for embedded 
devices predominantly used in the medical and automation 
industry, which have limited cost and resource in the systems. 
In this paper, we use Cycle per Instruction (CPI) to extract 
corresponding Program Counter (PC) values, and use it as 
ICMetrics features for correct program identification 
allowable to execute on the embedded architecture, and an 
unsupervised Self-Organising Map (SOM) is used to classify 
the behaviour of the embedded system. Results achieved in 
our experiment show that the proposed method can identify 
unknown program behaviours not included in the training set 
with great accuracy. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 
II discusses the related work in this domain. The threat model 
utilized for this work is introduced in Section III. A SOM-
based abnormal behaviour detection algorithm is presented in 
Section IV. To demonstrate the usefulness of the presented 
technique, Section V details the experimental design and 
results performed on an ARM Cortex-M3 embedded 
processor. Finally, the conclusions are presented in Section 
VI. 
II. RELATED WORK 
This section provides a brief overview of the previous work 
related to embedded systems security. As mentioned in 
Section I, information digitization to facilitate quick access 
has rendered digital privacy an important issue in protecting 
personal data [11]. While we believe our work to be the first 
demonstration of how on-chip debug information [12] can be 
used to identify anomalies in embedded system program 
execution, previous research has investigated the behaviour 
and prevalence of code modified with the intent of harming a 
system or its user. Arora et al [1] addressed secure program 
execution by focusing on the specific problem of ensuring that 
the program does not deviate from its intended behaviour. In 
their work, properties of an embedded program is extracted 
and used as the basis for enforcing permissible program 
behaviour.  
Software piracy has enormous economic impact [13], 
making it important to protect software intellectual property 
rights. Software watermarks, a unique identifier embedded in 
a protected software to discourage intellectual property theft is 
presented by Collberg and Thomborson [14]. In [15], 
Kolbitsch et al proposed a malware detection system to 
complement conventional AV software by matching 
automatically generated behaviour models against the runtime 
behaviour of unknown programs. Similar to [1], Rahmatian et 
al [5] used a CFG to detect intrusion for secured embedded 
systems by detecting behavioural differences between the 
correct system and malware. In their system, each executing 
process is associated with a finite state machine (FSM) that 
recognizes the sequences of system calls generated by the 
correct program. Attacks are detected if the system call 
sequence deviates from the known sequence. The system 
promises the ability to detect attacks in most application-
specific embedded processors. Wang et al [12] proposed a 
system call dependence graph (SCDG) birthmark software 
theft detection system. Software birthmarks have been defined 
as unique characteristics that a program possesses and can be 
used to identify the program. Without the need for source 
code, a dynamic analysis tool is used in [16] to generate 
system call trace and SCDGs to detect software component 
theft.  
Yang et al [17] presented an interesting approach for 
detecting digital audio forgeries mainly in MP3. Using a 
passive approach, they are able to detect doctored MP3 audio 
by checking frame offsets. Their work proves that frame 
offsets detected by the identification of quantization 
characteristics are good indication for locating forgeries. 
Experiment conducted on 128 MP3 speech and music clips 
shows 94% rate of correctly detecting deletion and insertion 
using frame offset. Panagakis and Kotropoulos [18] proposed 
the random spectral features (RSFs) and the labelled spectral 
features (LSFs) as intrinsic fingerprints suitable for device 
identification. The unsupervised RSFs reduce the 
dimensionality of the mean spectrogram of recorded speech, 
whiles the supervised LSFs derives a mapping between the 
feature space where the mean spectrograms lie onto the label 
space. Experimental result shows that RSFs and LSFs are able 
to identify a telephone handset with up to 97.58% accuracy.  
Information hiding can be used in authentication, copyright 
management as well as digital forensics [19]. Swaminathan et 
al [19] proposed an enhanced computer system performance 
with information hiding in the compiled program binaries. The 
system-wide performance is improved by providing additional 
information to the processor without changing the instruction 
set architecture. The proposed system employs look-up-tables 
for data embedding and extraction, which is subsequently 
stored in the program header and loaded into run-time memory 
at the beginning of program execution. In [20], Boufounos and 
Rana demonstrate with the use of signal processing and 
machine learning techniques, how to securely determine 
whether two signals are similar to each other. They also show 
how to utilize an embedding scheme for privacy-preserving 
nearest neighbour search by presenting protocols for clustering 
and authenticating applications. 
As indicated above, software birthmarks are unique 
characteristic that a program possesses and can be used to 
identify the program [12]. Similarly, ICMetrics can be defined 
as a unique characteristic that a program possesses when 
running on a particular embedded device and can be used to 
identify the program and hardware. Let p, q be programs. Let     
f (p) be a set of characteristics extracted from p when running 
on hardware f. We say f (p) is the ICMetrics of p, only if the 
following two conditions are satisfied: 
1) f (p)is obtained from p running on f. 
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3 
2) Program q is a copy of p => f (p) = f (q). 
The limitations with the use of system calls for program 
identification [1], 5] have been pointed out in [12] and are 
more prevalent in embedded systems settings, which typically 
have no operating system. The mentioned limitations are: 
1) Programs with little or no system calls such as programs 
solely based on arithmetic operation and 
2) Programs which do not have unique system call behaviours 
may fail to exhibit a birthmark. 
Using an unsupervised SOM to reduce the dimensionality 
of PC values, we introduce an offset rule similar to that 
presented in [17] to detect compromised programs. Thus using 
machine learning techniques [20] we are able to determine 
whether two PC values are similar to each other, with the use 
of the program binaries [19] and no prior knowledge of the 
source code. Our main contributions of this paper can be 
summarised as follows: 
1) We introduce a novel SOM based anomaly detection 
system, which can be used to combine with an ICMetrics 
system in the embedded devices predominantly adopted in 
the medical and automation industry. 
2) Our approach introduces a way to extract and analyse the 
useful low level hardware information, and used them as a 
feature to identify an embedded system’s abnormal 
behaviour, which allows our system to be used in a wider 
range of embedded systems, as it is independent to the 
high level software environments (e.g. Operating system, 
source programs). 
3) In terms of performance, the results achieved in our 
experiment show that our approach also outperforms other 
existing SOM based anomaly detection systems that utilise 
the high level software information. 
III. THREAT MODEL 
Embedded systems are used in a variety of applications in our 
daily life and enable sophisticated features for their users. 
However, these sophisticated features increase system 
complexity, which in turn results in a higher occurrence of 
bugs that require software updates to fix. Embedded systems 
with network access and code update support are therefore 
becoming increasingly mainstream. Unfortunately, this 
flexibility substantially increases the risk of malicious code 
injection in embedded systems. For example, there is a steady 
increase in the number and complexity of embedded 
processors in vehicular embedded networks (GPS, in-car 
entertainment, safety systems, car communication systems). 
This in turn has raised major software integrity issues, and it is 
critical to ensure that the executing instructions have not been 
changed by an attack.  
Attacks that are harming software integrity are generally 
known as code injection attacks, since they inject and execute 
malicious code instead of correct programs. A well-known 
code injection attack is stack smashing. If a function does not 
validate whether the length of the input exceeds the buffer 
size, an attacker can easily overflow the buffer. By 
overflowing the buffer, any location on the stack in the 
address space after the start of the buffer can be overwritten, 
including the return address of the susceptible function. Using 
this technique, an attacker can insert malicious code sequence, 
and overwrite the return address to point to the malicious 
code. Other attacks may overflow buffers stored on the heap, 
or exploit integer errors, dangling pointers, or format string 
vulnerabilities. Most programs with these vulnerabilities are 
also susceptible to so-called return-into-libc attacks, where an 
attacker modifies a code pointer to point to the existing code, 
usually the library code. Return-into-libc attacks are also 
called arc injection, since they inject an arc in a control flow 
graph of a program. 
The proposed system is designed to protect against the 
execution of malicious code that the system designer does not 
intend to execute. Our interest is to ensure that the software 
running continuously on an embedded device has essentially 
the same behaviour as the original program for the purposes of 
security and detect any possible changes on the trusted 
software. The basis of our proposed system of ICMetrics is 
akin to dynamic systems analysis, which analyse the execution 
of a program on an embedded architecture. Thus the system 
presented is mainly for flagging rather than directly stopping 
execution of untrusted code.  
A common theme among many security attacks is hijacking 
the trusted code at run-time, so even if the original code is not 
malicious by intent, it can be manipulated by the attacker [6]. 
As mentioned above, a very common method is the 
exploitation of a buffer overflow to overwrite a return address, 
altering program control flow to a malicious code. We assume 
that the unexpected software running on the embedded device 
will result in a significant behavioural difference compared to 
the original program. The proposed system monitors the 
executing program continuously, while constructing its 
behaviour to detect any changes. It is observed that any 
behavioural difference in the program execution trace, for 
example in medical devices can be detrimental and must be 
flagged in real-time by monitoring the system behaviour. The 
proposed intrusion detection method will not prevent buffer 
overflow, but it could detect the abnormal behaviour caused 
by buffer overflow by monitoring system behaviour. 
IV. ALGORITHM FOR ABNORMAL PROGRAM BEHAVIOUR 
DETECTION 
Generally, from a software architecture point of view, there 
are three structural levels in a program: (a) function call level, 
as represented by function call relationship; (b) internal 
control flow for each function, represented by a basic-block 
CFG; and (c) instruction stream within each CFG [1]. From a 
hardware point of view, the processor’s architecture and 
performance can affect the execution of instructions. For 
instance, multi-cycle function calls or condition branches 
could decrease the performance of a processor. On the other 
hand, as the PC register indicates where a program is in its 
code sequence, it can be used to represent the instruction 
sequence within the CFG. Consequently, we could first detect 
the function call and CFG based on the variance of the 
processor’s performance, then analyse the PC values within 
each CFG. Finally, an overall evaluation could indicate 
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whether the system is compromised or not. In the proposed 
work, we measure the average CPI as a parameter of the 
processor’s performance. A block diagram of the architecture 
of the proposed abnormal program behaviour detection system 
is shown in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2. Overall block diagram of the proposed abnormal program behaviour 
detection algorithm. 
 
The average CPI calculator in Fig. 2 is first used to 
calculate average CPI value, and it continually reads clock 
cycle and PC data from the time counter and PC register. 
Sequentially, the average CPI values are used to obtain phase 
and peak information in the Phase and Peak Point Detector 
module respectively, and the information indicates where 
function calls or the conditional branch occur in the executing 
program. Afterwards, the obtained locations and their 
corresponding PC sequence are used in a SOM based 
similarity analyser for abnormal program behaviour detection. 
If the phase’s information and the PC sequences deviate from 
a known program, the SOM based classifier asserts the 
intrusion detected output. In the last stage, the results of SOM 
are validated by comparing with their expected property table 
(i.e. number of peak within each phase and associated network 
node).  
A. Average CPI Calculator Module 
CPI is one of the most commonly used parameter for 
measuring processor’s performance, which indicates the 
complexity of instructions executed within a particular period 
of time. Average CPI of a processor can be calculated based 
on (1): 
 
C
CPI
I
  (1) 
where I is the total number of executed instructions, C is the 
number of cycles for executing I instructions. As number of 
cycles can be calculated by time elapsed and maximum clock 
frequency of a processor, the CPI can easily be accessed by 
modern debug facilities. In Fig. 3, an average CPI profile is 
generated while a program is running in an ARM cortex-M3 
processor, where I and the maximum frequency are set to 211 
and 120 MHz respectively. 
In Fig. 3, the program consists of five different functions, 
and each function is called in a sequence. While a new 
function is called, the CPI value is significantly increased, 
which means the performance of the processor is decreased 
accordingly. The main reason for that is that the PC jumps to 
other memory location in order to execute the newly called 
function (as illustrated in Fig. 7 (a)), where it usually involves 
many multi-clock cycles instructions. As a result, the average 
CPI value is significantly changed. Similarly, the CPI values 
vary within each function, and the number of executed 
instructions I decides the resolution of the average CPI profile, 
the value of I varies from [1 n], where n is the total length of 
programme. The larger number of I used in the CPI profile, 
the less details of the CPI profile, which means some of 
potential abnormal behaviour of the monitored programme 
may not be detected. However, although with smaller number 
of I, we could have more sensitive of the detection 
mechanism, it would significantly increase the computational 
cost of the detection system. For instance, if I uses ‘1’, which 
means that every single instruction in the programme will be 
examined and it does not contain any continuous pattern that 
can be used to identify the characteristics of the monitored 
programme Therefore, in this paper, the value of I is set to 211, 
which gives a gives the best balance of the accuracy and 
computational complexity of the proposed system. In the 
following sub-sections, we introduce a method to 
automatically obtain the position information of the phases 
(i.e. function calls) and peaks (i.e. branch conditions). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example of average CPI profile. 
 
B. Phase and Peak Point Detector Module 
The main task of this module is to obtain the locations of 
the phase and peak within the average CPI profile. There are 
two sub-blocks: local and global critical point localisers are 
used to localise the peak and phase positions.  
1) Local Critical Point Localiser  
The local critical point localiser is used to localise the local 
significant variance points from the average CPI profile. The 
proposed method first calculates absolute differences between 
adjacent elements in the average CPI profile, and then 
localises the peak value within a 1×3 rectangular range. 
Let fmean denotes averaged CPI, absolute differences between 
adjacent elements of  fmean can then be calculated by: 
 ( ) ( 1) ( )mean meand n f n f n     (2) 
where 1 ,n N   N is the total numbers of elements in array 
fmean, d(n) is nth element in an array of absolute differences 
between adjacent elements of fmean(n). 
After obtained d(n), a 1×3 rectangular window is used as a 
mask to scan all the elements in d(n). Let d(n-1), d(n) and 
d(n+1) denote the three elements within the 1×3 rectangular 
window respectively, and the locations of the detected peaks 
can be calculated by:  
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 ( ')    for ( ) ( 1)  ( ) ( 1)p n n d n d n and d n d n      (3)  
where p(n’) is nth element in an array of detected peak 
locations. 
The main advantage of the proposed local critical point 
localiser is adaptively detecting the peaks without the need of 
setting any fixed threshold, hence the proposed local critical 
point localiser would not be limited on any particular scenario, 
and it can also detect the peaks that have minor variance. Fig. 
4 shows resulting diagram after applying the local critical 
point localiser on the points in Fig.3. 
 
Fig. 4 Resulting diagram after applying the local critical point localiser. 
 
2) Global Critical Point Localiser  
The global critical point localiser is used to localise the 
global significant variance points from the average CPI 
profile, which indicate the locations of each phase.  
Step 1: Localising the elements in d(n) that are greater than 
(max(d) + min(d)) / 2. These elements represent the boundary 
points at each adjacent phase. The selected elements are stored 
in array p’. 
Step 2: Calculating absolute differences between adjacent 
elements of array 'p , if the absolute differences between kth 
and (k+1)th elements are greater than t, then store p’(k) and 
p’(k+1) into array 
hp , where t is the number of CPI samples 
in a phase. The value of t depends on the minimum accepted 
phase length of the training programme. The smaller the value 
of t is, the more details of the average CPI profile can be 
obtained. On the other hand, in consequence the complexity of 
the proposed algorithm would be increased. In this paper, t is 
set to 50 in order to balance the complexity and performance 
of the proposed algorithm. 
 Step 3: Checking absolute difference between every 
adjacent phase (2 ')hp k and (2 ' 1)hp k  , if the difference is 
greater than ‘2’ or equal to ‘0’, then (2 ' 1)hp k  = (2 ')hp k +1. 
The main purpose of this step is to make sure that the adjacent 
phases do not include the overlapped boundaries. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Resulting diagram after applying the global critical point localiser. 
Fig. 5 shows resulting diagram after applying the global 
critical points localiser on Fig. 3. 
The obtained peak and phase locations are first converted 
into their corresponding locations in PC profile by (3):  
 
( ') 1
( ')
( ') 1
( ' 1)
s
e
hs h
he h
p I p n
p I p n I
p I p k
p I p k
  
  
  
  
  (3) 
where ps and pe are the start and end locations in PC profile for 
the n’th peak respectively. phs and phe are the start and end 
locations in PC profile for the k’th phase respectively. I is the 
total number of executed instructions used to calculate average 
CPI profile. 
The converted locations are used to select appropriate PC 
patterns for training and testing of the similarity analyser. 
C. SOM based Similarity Analyser Module 
The designed similarity analyser is capable of classifying 
and recognising between known and unknown programs while 
the programs are running. There are two major levels of the 
classification and recognition process: the function call level 
and the PC pattern level, where each phase and peak is 
measured to ascertain the originality of the program in 
execution. Any significant difference shows that the numbers 
of function calls differ, characteristic of function call and PC 
signature are different to the original program, and an 
abnormal behaviour notification could be signified. The main 
advantage of the proposed similarity analyser is that it governs 
the classification and recognition at two different levels: 1) 
phase and peak level, and 2) the PC pattern level. Phase and 
peak level are statistically analysed, and the corresponding PC 
patterns are classified in SOM. Consequently, even if the 
malicious codes have similar information of the phase and 
peak, it is very difficult to have the exactly same PC pattern as 
the original code. 
Kohonen’s SOM [21] is a common pattern recognition and 
clustering process, where intrinsic inter- and intra-pattern 
relationships among the stimuli and responses are learnt 
without the presence of a potentially biased or subjective 
external influence is presented, and would be adopted in this 
work as the basis for our classifier. We utilize the k−means 
nature of the SOM, to partition the extracted PC signatures 
into a user-specified number of clusters, k (number of groups). 
In the proposed work, the analyser uses SOM to measure 
similarity between known and executing programs in terms of 
PC pattern. The value of k should at minimum be equal to the 
total number of programs intended to run on the embedded 
hardware. The value of k used in this work is set to two times 
(2x) the number of known programs that can legitimately run 
on the embedded processor. This value of k is to handle the 
linear separating boundaries between known program 
behaviours as defined in K-means clustering; avoiding the 
computational overheads associated with a nonlinear kernel K-
means.  Specifically, we extract static properties of an 
embedded program to enforce permissible program behaviour 
at run time.  The PC patterns are a set of N-dimensional 
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vectors, where the size of the vectors N is equal to number of 
executed instructions I. The size N of the vector, if set too 
large will add significant performance overhead to the 
application that it represents. Similarly, if it is set too small, it 
will not be robust enough to distinguish between applications. 
Thus choosing the right size of N is very important.  
The best value of N is the minimum number of PC values 
that offers the best analyser performance. The value of N 
should define the permissible behaviour of a program by 
identifying suitable properties or invariants that are indicators 
of untampered execution, thus very unlikely to be violated 
when program is compromised. After a number of empirical 
experiments, the value of N in this work has been set to 211 
following an examination of the test data. 
To enable continuous analysis, the system presented here 
requires just 211 PC values at a time to infer its corresponding 
application. Because the system is based on a SOM, a variant 
of the k−means algorithm, the value of k should also be set. 
The value of k is set depending on the total number of 
algorithms or programs under investigation, and the number of 
distinct phases in any particular application. At minimum, the 
value of k should be equal or greater to the number of 
algorithms under investigation. The value of k in this work has 
been set to 20 as the testing database has 10 different 
programs.  However, this can naturally be adapted to 
requirement of different usage scenarios according to the 
above given guidelines. 
PC values extracted from the PC profile, corresponding to 
the peaks in the CPI profile are used as inputs to the SOM 
during training and testing. For a given network with k neurons 
and N-dimensional input vector Ki, the distance from the jth 
neuron with weight vector wj (j<k) is given by 
  
2
2
1
N
i
j l jl
l
D K w

    (4) 
where wjl is the lth component of weight vector wj. The vector 
components of the winning neuron wk with minimum distance 
Dk are updated as follows, where (0,1) is the learning rate. 
  ik kw K w     (5) 
The update is done only at the training phase. Additionally, 
for every neuron in the network we maintain four extra 
parameters: the minimum, maximum, mean and standard 
deviation of distances of all input vectors associated with any 
particular neuron. 
After training, the next step is to associate each of the 
network neurons with the corresponding program or sub-
program. In this work, we use Vector Quantization (VQ) [21] 
to assign labels to neurons in the network as follows: 
1) Assign labels to all training data. The label is an identifier 
for the program from which the training data has been 
extracted. 
2) Find the neuron in the network with the minimum distance 
to the labelled input data. 
3) For each input data maintain the application label, the 
corresponding neuron and the distance measured. The 
distance is maintained as a tie breaker for applications that 
share similar address space.  
In each phase of the original training program, we first 
count a group of input vectors that are associated with each 
neuron, and then calculate mean value and standard deviation 
of the group of distances, alongside the minimum and 
maximum distances (Dmin and Dmax) by: 
 
1
1 n
i
i
D
n


    (6) 
 2
min
1
1
(1 ) (D )
1
n
i
i
D
n
  

    

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where D denotes the group of distances, α denotes errors of 
the standard deviation to accommodate any quantization errors 
in the calculation process. The value of α in this work has 
been set to 2.5%. 
Sequentially, a statistical table Tk is generated for the kth 
phase, where detailed attribute information (e.g. minimum and 
maximum distances, number of input vectors that are 
associated with each neuron and their standard deviation) are 
recorded for the phase. On the same principle, each phase is 
associated with its corresponding statistical table. 
In the testing stage, each input vector is assigned to a 
neuron that has the shortest distance. Let Ki denotes the input 
vector and it is assigned to the jth neuron with distance Di, the 
proposed algorithm first compares the distance Di with the 
minimum and maximum distances of the jth neuron from all the 
statistical tables, and then decides whether the input vector 
belongs to the phase. Generally, the successful input vector 
should meet the following two conditions: 
1) The distance Di should meet the condition Dmin< Di <Dmax, 
where Dmin and Dmax are minimum and maximum distance 
of the jth neuron at the kth phase. 
2) The jth neuron is a dominant neuron in the kth phase, which 
means the occupancy of the neuron in the original statistical 
table is greater than 3% of total numbers of input vectors. 
The successful candidate neurons are labelled to reflect their  
corresponding phase numbers. Otherwise, the candidate is 
marked as ‘-1’, which indicates the input vector is unknown. 
Consequently, the known program’s phase should consist of a 
set of known phase number; the dominant phase number to 
indicate the result of the phase. After obtaining the results of 
each phase, another statistical table Tk’ is generated, which 
contains the same type of information as Tk. A validation 
process is performed in the next stage to examine the 
similarity of these tables. 
D. Validation Module 
The validation module is designed to validate the results from 
the SOM analyser. Usually, most of the input vectors can be 
classified using the SOM analyser. However, due to the 
variance of circumstances, the trace of program cannot always 
be exactly the same as the original training program, thus a 
global validation stage becomes necessary to improve the 
overall classification results. 
In general, the results from the SOM analyser could consist  
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Fig. 6 Overall flow chart of the validation module. 
 
of two categories: known and unknown samples. For the 
known samples, the SOM reports their potential phase 
number. For the unknown samples, the SOM analyser marks 
the phase number with ‘-1’. Thus, the validation module 
processes the two cases separately. Fig. 6 shows flow chart of 
the validation module. 
As shown in Fig. 6, the main task is to validate the similarity 
between the testing statistical table T’ and the original 
statistical table T. In order to examine the similarity of two 
tables, histograms of the associated neurons from the two 
tables are used. Pseudo-codes for calculating the similarity of 
the statistical tables are summarised as follows: 
 
Calculating the similarity of the statistical tables: 
1. Input: Tk and Tk’’ are statistical tables for the original phase k and the 
testing phase k’ respectively. 
2. Output: Similarity between phase k and k’.  
3. sort the Tk  by descending order of neuron’s occupancy; 
4. /* look-up the statistical table Tk */ 
5. for all neuron nodes in Tk do 
6.    if occupancy of the jth neuron  >  3% then 
7.    d(i) = j; /* record the number of the neuron in array d */ 
8.    i ++; 
9.    end  
10. end 
11.  /* look-up the statistical table Tk’’ */ 
12. for all neuron nodes in Tk’’ do 
13.    if occupancy of the jth neuron  >  3% then 
14.    d’(i)=j; /*record the number of the neuron in array d’ */ 
15.    i ++; 
16.    end  
17. end 
18.    x   d d’; /* x is the intersection of d and d’ */ 
19.  /*generate output*/ 
20. if length(x)/length(d)  >  80% then 
21.    the phase k’ is similar to the phase k; 
22. else 
23.    the phase k’ is not similar to the phase k; 
24. end  
 
After comparing the statistical tables, the difference of the 
number of peaks in the original phase k and testing phase k’ is 
then calculated. If the difference is less than 10% of total 
number of peaks in the original phase, it confirms the phase 
number is k.  
In general, the SOM analyser could locally calculate the 
similarity for a pair of input vectors (i.e. peaks). However, it 
has limitation on globally indicating a group of peaks (i.e. 
phases). The validation stage can be used to remedy this 
problem. In the experimental result section, we show the 
improvement of the SOM results when the validation stage is 
applied subsequently. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS 
An embedded system based on a Keil MCBSTM32F200 
evaluation board equipped with an ARM 32-bit Cortex-M3 
processor-based microcontroller is used in the proposed work 
[22], which consists of various peripheral interfaces (e.g. 
touchscreen, Ethernet port, serial port, analogue voltage 
control for Analogue-to-digital converter (ADC) input and 
debug interface). A combination of KEIL µVision IDE, and 
ULINKpro Debug and Trace Unit [23] is used to download 
the program and trace the instructions executed in the 
microcontroller. High-speed data and instruction trace are 
streamed directly to the host computer allowing off-line 
analysis of the program behaviour [23]. MATLAB is used to 
implement the proposed method prior to hardware 
implementation. It is worth noting that the experimental 
platform is a typical low cost ARM-based embedded 
development board, and it comes with only 128KB of on-chip 
RAM and 2MB of external SRAM, for which only 1MB is 
usable when the tracing port is enabled. Thus we can only 
analyse a limited number of programs at a time, and the 
complexity of the tested programs are also limited. These 
limitations fall within the scope of our initial embedded 
architecture, expected to have minimal memory, power and 
Start
if phase number k 
!= ‘-1’
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if T’ is similar to Tk
Confirm the phase 
number is k
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8 
computational resources. The concept presented here is 
naturally scalable; as the available resources increase, the 
complexity of applications can also be increased. 
A. Benchmark Test Suite 
In the proposed work, seven algorithms from the 
automotive package of the widely recognised EEMBC 
benchmark suite [24] are selected, in which five algorithms 
(i.e. the first five benchmarks in Table I) are used to train and 
test the SOM analyser and the other benchmarks are only used 
in the testing. Details of the used benchmarks are presented in 
Table I. 
As can be seen from Table I, the seven benchmarks are set 
with different parameters and performing various functions. 
For instance, the benchmark “a2time” is used to perform angle 
to time calculation, where “NUM_TEST” indicates the 
number of sets of input test data stimuli, and 
“TENTH_DEGREES” indicates the number of 1/10 degrees 
in a circle. Overall, they do not only have different 
complexities and characteristics, but also contain similar sub-
functions, which make them suitable test candidates for the 
proposed experiments.  
In order to train with all five benchmarks, they are mixed 
together to form a new program, where each benchmark is 
treated as a separate function call. The new program is 
executed twice in order to generate enough training samples. 
For testing, a random function call generator is used to switch 
between benchmarks form the test samples. The next section 
explains how the random function call switching works. 
 
TABLE I 
DETAILS OF THE USED BENCHMARKS 
Benchmarks Description Parameters 
a2time 
Angle to Time 
Conversion 
NUM_TESTS: 500 
TENTH_DEGREES: 3600 
rspeed Road Speed Calculation 
NUM_TESTS: 500 
SPEED_SCALE_FAC: 36000 
bitmnp Bit Manipulation 
NUM_TESTS: 128 
INPUT_CHARS: 20 
CHAR_COLUMNS: 5 
idctrn 
Inverse Discrete Cosine 
Transform 
NUM_TESTS: 8192 
COS_SCALE_FAC: 4096 
COS_SCALE_EXP: 12 
puwmod Pulse Width Modulation 
NUM_TESTS: 2420 
MAX_PHASE: 20 
tblook 
Table lookup and 
interpolation 
NUM_TESTS: 232 
NUM_X_ENTRIES: 50 
NUM_Y_ENTRIES: 50 
ttsprk Tooth to Spark 
NUM_TESTS: 200 
CYLINDERS: 4 
B. Random Function Call Generator  
In order to check the performance of the proposed system 
for complex test samples in a variety of scenarios, a random 
function call generator is used to randomly select the 
benchmarks and form a new program. Thus, the function call 
sequence of the new program is varied at every run. 
Consequently, a set of unique test programs can be generated. 
In addition, since the testing program is combined with 
different function calls and randomly mixed during the run-
time of the embedded system, the testing methodology could 
be used to verify the performance of the proposed system in 
the scenarios that have dynamic variance (e.g. different 
program flow, interrupt, inputs, etc.). 
The random function call generator mainly consists of two 
components: a true random number generator and a switch 
statement. In order to generate true random numbers, an ADC 
and a potentiometer are used to generate a random seed, which 
is subsequently used as an input seed for a pseudo-random 
number generator. In general, the ADC reads the voltage from 
the potentiometer and converts it into a 12-bit digital number. 
As the voltage of the potentiometer is adjustable and sensitive, 
the voltage value is not constant, even without turning the 
potentiometer. Thus, after the conversion, the digital number 
is always different, which allows the pseudorandom number 
generator to create a true random number. For instance, if a 
program consists of n different function calls, a random 
number x is first generated, where 1 < x < n. Subsequently, the 
random number x is used to select which benchmark will be 
called. The generated random number is used in a switch 
statement, which actives the corresponding function call (e.g. 
if x = 1, “a2time” will be called). In this experiment, the 
potentiometer is manually adjusted for every run, which 
further ensures the voltage is completely different from the 
previous one. 
In addition, the random function call generator can also 
record the function call sequence for every execution, which 
means a complete reference table can be generated at the end 
of testing. With comparing the test output of the SOM with the 
expected output from reference table, an accurate and 
complete evaluation result can be generated. 
C. Program Database  
A total of 104 programs are generated using the random 
function call generator presented in the previous section. The 
104 programs used for testing can further be divided into the 
following three subcategories: 
1) Programs with original function call sequence: Programs 
in this category consist of fixed function call sequence, 
which are the same as the one used in training.  There are 
21 programs, out of the 104, which are taken from this 
category. 
2) Programs with random generated function call sequence 
(known): Programs in this category consist of randomly 
generated function calls in the sequence, with all the 
functions drawn from the training samples. The number of 
samples in this category is 42.  
3) Programs with randomly generated function call 
sequence (unknown): Programs in this category consist of 
randomly generated function calls in the sequence with 
two unknown functions included. The number of samples 
in this category is 41. 
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Fig. 7. Examples of PC profiles from the used program database. (a) Program used for training; (b) Program from category 1; (c) and (d) Programs from category 
2; (e) and (f) Programs from category 3. 
 
In the experiment, the first category is used to simulate 
instances where the embedded system is not modified, such as 
programs running with factory setting. The second category is 
used to simulate the circumstances of an embedded system 
with normal behaviour; for instance, the programs with 
legitimate credentials to run on the embedded system. Finally, 
the last category is used to simulate tampered systems with 
unknown programs; for example, the system may launch some 
unknown programs, triggered by buffer overflow attack. Thus, 
our threat model is well covered by the three set of categories. 
Fig. 7 shows some examples of PC profiles extracted from test 
programs. 
In Fig. 7, numbers inside the red cycles are labels for the 
different benchmarks, where ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’, and ‘5’ represent 
the five known benchmarks respectively with ‘x’ and ‘y’ 
representing the two unknown benchmarks. As can be seen 
from Fig. 7 (a) and (b), although they contain exactly the same 
benchmark codes and sequences, the PC addresses and 
outlines of each benchmark are slightly different. Especially, 
when the sequence of the benchmark is randomly mixed (for 
example, Fig. 7 (c) and (d)), the resulting PC profiles are 
completely different. This could help with examination of the 
trained SOM analyser on false negative rate. In Fig. 7 (e) and 
(f), the profile of the unknown programs ‘x’ and ‘y’ are quite 
similar to the known programs ‘1’ and ‘2’ respectively, which 
is used to simulate the possible attacks that try to model their 
peaks and phase information like the genuine programme 
Using the true/false positive and negative rates from the 
trained SOM analyser, different programs with similar profiles 
can further be examined. 
D. System Implementation   
The abnormal program behaviour detection system has been 
successfully implemented in MATLAB for off-line data 
analysis. The system implementation is divided into three 
parts: 
 
1) CPI-related module 
This module is first used to extract useful information from 
the program’s tracing file, and then it calculates the average 
CPI for every run. The program’s tracing file contains two 
types of information: PC address and time tag for every 
executed instruction. The PC addresses are only recorded in a 
file that will be used in the SOM-based similarity analyser 
module. However, the corresponding time tags are used to 
calculate CPI profile for the executed programs. In this work, 
the number of instructions is set to 2048. The frequency of the 
ARM cortex-M3 microcontroller used runs at 120 MHz, thus, 
the average CPI for every 2048 instructions can then be 
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10 
calculated by (1). Subsequently, the phase and peak point 
detector localises the peaks and phases from the average CPI 
profile. The obtained peak and phase locations are finally 
converted into their corresponding locations in PC profile by 
(3).  
 
2) SOM-based similarity analyser module 
The start and end locations of each peak can be used to 
select a serial of PC addresses, and this forms an input vector 
with 1×2048 elements which is subsequently fed into the  
SOM-based similarity analyser. The maximum number of 
nodes and iterations for the SOM are set to 20 and 1000 
respectively. A statistical table for each phase and estimated 
outputs for each peak are generated after the training process. 
The same process is repeated during the testing. The generated 
results are then used in the validation module. 
 
3) Validation and evaluation module 
The algorithm stated in Section IV-D is implemented in this 
module. Based on the validation results, the peaks and phases 
of each input program are finally classified. The final 
evaluation result consists of two levels: peak and phase levels. 
At the peak level, the final report does not only include results 
for every single program, but also the entire database. The 
measurements of the evaluation mainly includes correct 
recognition rate (true positive (Tp) and true negative (Tn)), rate 
of misclassified samples (false positive (Fp)), and rate of 
samples incorrectly classified as unknown (false negative 
(Fn)). Based on the measurements, accuracy, precision and 
recall rates for the proposed system can be calculated.  
Accuracy 
It is the rate of correctly labelled samples, which can be 
calculated by (Tp+ Tn) / total number of samples. 
Precision 
It is the rate of positively labelled samples whose labels are 
correct, which measures the classifier’s resistance to false 
positives and can be calculated by Tp / (Tp +Fp). 
Recall 
It is the rate of samples that should have been positively 
labelled that are correctly positively labelled, which 
measures the classifier’s resistance to false negatives and 
can be calculated by Tp  / (Tp +Fn). 
 
A classifier’s precision and recall results provide insight 
into what types of errors the classifier tends to make, rather 
than only reporting the number of misclassified samples. 
E. Experimental Results  
In this experiment, the proposed system classifies the 
programs’ peaks and phases into different categories, where 
the known peaks and phases will be assigned their 
corresponding names and unknown ones will be labelled as ‘-
1’. Overall, the proposed system has 99.9% and 97.7% 
successful identification rates for 1040 program phases and 
145763 peaks respectively. Additionally, the proposed system 
identifies unknown programs’ peaks that were not in the 
training set with over 98.4% accuracy. In the following sub-
sections, the analyses of the experimental results are 
categorised by program type. 
 
1) Programs with original function call sequence 
In this category, there are total 21 programs, which include 
31884 peak samples. Overall, the proposed system has 97.9% 
successful identification rates for the peaks. Results of 
accuracy, precision and recall rates for each program are 
illustrated in Fig. 8. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Results of accuracy, precision and recall rates for category 1. 
 
2) Programs with random generated function call sequence 
(include only known benchmarks): 
In this category, there are 42 programs, which include 
57242 peak samples. Overall, the proposed system has 97.1% 
successful identification rates for the peaks. Results of 
accuracy, precision and recall rates for each program are 
illustrated in Fig. 9. 
3) Programs with random generated function call sequence 
(include known and unknown benchmarks): 
In this category, there are 41 programs, which include 
56637 peak samples. Overall, the proposed system has 97.5% 
successful identification rates for the peaks. Results of 
accuracy, precision and recall rates for each program are 
illustrated in Fig. 10. 
In general, as the complexity of the test categories are 
varied, the first category has the smoothest and best accuracy, 
precision and recall rates. In contrast, the accuracy, precision 
and recall rates of the second and third categories are 
relatively lower, than the first one. Also, the types and the 
lengths of each tested program in the last two categories are 
different, which causes the resulting rates of each program 
have relatively higher variance than the first one.  
As indicated in Table I, the database employed mainly 
consists of seven different benchmarks, where five of them are 
in the training set and the remainder are not in the training set. 
Table II summarises the results of each benchmark in terms of 
accuracy, precision and recall rates. 
As can be seen from Table II, the overall performance of 
the proposed system with validation process is much higher 
than without the validation process. The reason is that the 
extra similarity comparisons between original and test 
statistical tables help the proposed system to re-estimate the 
results of the SOM analyser.  Especially, when there is a 
unknown benchmark with similar sample peaks to the known 
benchmark  that  appears  in  the  test  program. The  result  of  
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TABLE II 
PERFORMANCE RESULTS FOR THE USED BENCHMARKS 
 
Benchmarks 
Without Validation With Validation 
Accuracy (%) Precision (%) Recall (%) Accuracy (%) Precision (%) Recall (%) 
a2time 8.1 94.2 8.1 98.0 99.5 98.5 
rspeed 37.7 95.3 38.5 94.9 98.1 96.7 
bitmnp 76.2 99.7 76.5 97.6 99.7 97.9 
idctrn 87.7 99.8 87.8 98.2 99.8 98.4 
puwmod 47.6 98.2 48.1 97.0 99.1 97.8 
tblook 98.4 0 0 98.4 0 0 
ttsprk 99.1 0 0 99.1 0 0 
Overall 
Performance 
68.0 99.3 66.2 97.7 99.5 98.0 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Results of accuracy, precision and recall rates for category 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Results of accuracy, precision and recall rates for category 3. 
 
using validation process is significant higher than without 
validation process in the system, for example, the accuracy 
and recall rates of the first benchmark ‘a2time’ is significantly 
lower than by using validation process. The reason is that 
‘a2time’ and ‘tblook’ have very similar distances to the sample 
SOM node, which cause them to be classified into same 
cluster. For the known benchmarks, as the test samples are not 
exactly the same as the samples in the training set, the 
accuracy and recall rates are also lower, than the result using 
the validation process. For the unknown benchmarks, the 
results with and without validation are constant, as there are 
no positive samples in the sets, the precision and recall rates 
are zero. 
It is worth noting that our work is independent of the 
processor’s architecture or operating system’s kernel, thus 
making it compatible with most modern embedded systems. 
Hence, the proposed work is particularly suitable for providing 
possible security solutions to commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) products, where the products have many restrictions 
on modifying their internal programs or hardware 
architectures. The proposed system can be run on a non-
intrusive debug facility, a non-intrusive infrastructure that is 
generally used during device software development at present 
in all production devices, that connects to the targeted 
embedded device through a debug interface [25], [26], which 
means that the proposed system would not affect the 
performance of the monitored embedded system in terms of 
additional memory and processor usage. When an end user 
downloads a new program in the embedded device, a training 
process will start; the new trained parameters of the SOM and 
the statistic information of monitored program can then be 
generated and stored in the debug facility, which can only be 
accessed by the debug facility. The proposed system naturally 
combines the embedded system’s hardware and software 
together, introducing a new potential direction to secure an 
embedded device. In one of the authors’ previous works [27], 
an implementation of the conventional SOM on a Xilinx 
Virtex-4 with 40 neurons required only 22.1% of the available 
5,184 Kb Block RAM. The debug facility targeted for our 
initial on-chip prototyping is utilising a mid-range Xilinx 
Virtex-6 FPGA having 25,344 Kb (max.) Block RAM; thus a 
similar implementation should utilise approximately 5% of the 
available Block RAM. Again, the Virtex-4 design 
implementation clocked at 25MHz could train with 
approximately 10,000 patterns per second. As a result of this, 
the hardware implementation of the SOM produces a 
significant speed improvement, which is 30 times faster than 
the original SOM implemented on a state-of-art PC [27]. 
Hence, the preferred implementation is to follow a hardware 
acceleration approach that facilitated rapid SOM processing 
suitable for real-time execution. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a Self-Organising Map based approach is 
proposed to enhance embedded system security by detecting 
abnormal behaviour, in which features derived from internal 
embedded processor are extracted and used in the SOM to 
identify abnormal behaviour in embedded devices. The 
proposed method can also be combined with ICMetrics 
system, as different behaviours can be represented with 
different basic numbers, hence, different encryption keys can 
be generated by the key cryptography mechanism, using the 
recall phase. Results achieved in our experiment show that the 
proposed method can identify unknown behaviours not in the 
training set with over 98.4% accuracy. The proposed work 
provides protection at different levels for embedded 
architectures such as function call sequence, internal control 
flow and instruction stream within each function. Since the 
main aim of this research work is to implement a real-time 
security solution for complex embedded computer 
architectures, more evaluation on realistic attacks for the 
proposed algorithms will further be investigated. For 
evaluation of real-time detection system, the proposed method 
can also be implemented with a soft-core processor on FPGA 
as part of an on-line protection system, and subsequently 
halting the program to prevent abnormal behaviours in the 
system, or even alongside existing debug IP in a direct 
Systems-on-Chip implementation. 
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